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Summary: This article treats the sense of taste in Epicurean thought through the evi-
dence in Lucretius’ De rerum natura. It reconstructs Lucretius’ account of what taste is 
and how it works, with a view to explaining instances like the taste of salt by the seaside, 
where we seem to taste at a distance. I argue that such instances are not exceptions, but 
examples that reveal more about the processes behind them. When analyzed in conjunc-
tion with the physiology of taste and the water cycle, the salty taste of sea air confirms 
the traditional view that the perception of flavor consistently occurs through direct 
contact with the object of perception, not through indirect contact with an intermedi-
ary. Moreover, it advances the understanding of what comes into contact, what the per-
ceiver contributes to taste, and taste’s sensory threshold. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The sensory turn has led to a renewed scholarly interest in Epicurean 
theories about the senses, for which Lucretius’ De rerum natura offers 
some of the most important evidence. While the preponderance of that 
attention has been devoted to the sense of sight, there have also been 
studies on the rest of the so-called five senses, as well as on other per-
ceptions, the nature of sensible qualities and their relationship to the 
senses’ spheres of discrimination, the role of the senses in epistemology,  
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and the possibility of synaesthesia.1 In the context of the debates about 
touch, the sense of taste has also come under scrutiny. The testimony of 
De rerum natura (hereafter DRN) is particularly important in these cases 
as there is no explicit discussion of either in what survives of Epicurus’ 
works.2 The discussion in other Epicurean sources is minimal.3 The tra-
ditional scholarly perspective is that the Epicureans believed that the 
sense of taste functions through direct contact between the sense organ 
and the object of perception, i.e. between the tongue and food or drink.4 
It is generally thought that, in this, taste is like the sense of touch, which 
also operates through direct contact, whereas the senses of sight, hear-
ing, and smell entail the apprehension of objects at a distance via contact 
 
 
1 On smell, see Koenen 1997. On sound, see Koenen 1999; Koenen 2004; Holmes 2005; 
Zinn 2018. On touch, see Maurette 2014: esp. 312-15; Sedley 2018. On taste, see Rosen-
meyer 1996 and, regarding taste in ancient thought more generally, Rudolph 2018a 
and Rudolph 2018b: esp. 49-54 on the atomists. On other perceptions, such as that of 
time and of the self, see e.g. Verde 2008; Zinn 2016; Németh 2017: esp. ch.1. On sen-
sible qualities and the senses’ spheres of discrimination, see e.g. Sedley 1989; Furley 
1993; Monet 1996; O’Keefe 1997. On the role of the senses in epistemology, see e.g. 
Fowler 1984; Everson 1990; Asmis 2009; Vogt 2016. On synaesthesia, see Walters 2013. 
These topics are not mutually exclusive nor treated as such by the aforementioned 
studies, many of which contribute substantially to multiple topics. Broader studies 
that also include treatment of many of these topics include Asmis 1984; Long & 
Sedley 1987: esp. 1.72-90, 2.75-93. The work of scholars like Solmsen (e.g. 1961), 
Schoenheim 1966, Striker 1977, Glidden (e.g. 1979a, 1979b), and Taylor 1980, while 
perhaps too early to be considered part of the sensory turn per se, is also noteworthy 
and has contributed significantly to subsequent scholarship on these topics. 
2 I have found none. Other scholars concur. Regarding taste, see e.g. Bailey 1947: 
3.1257; Rosenmeyer 1996: 138; Koenen 1997: 167 n. 18. Regarding touch, see e.g. As-
mis 1984: 105 n. 2; Koenen 1997: 163 n. 1.  
3 The most important example is PHerc. 19/698, which may be from Phld. De Sensibus; 
on this, see p. 181 below. See also Plut. Adv. Col. 1109c, 1110b-c. 
4 See e.g. Bailey 1947: 3.1179, 3.1253; Asmis 1984: 105, 111, 115-16; Asmis 2009: 102.  
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with intermediaries.5 Others have suggested that all of the senses are re-
ducible to touch.6 Schoenheim and Rosenmeyer propose specifically the 
touch of effluences.7 In support of the possibility that taste might work 
this way, both mention the salty taste we experience near the sea (DRN 
4.222-24, 6.928-30).8 The Epicureans believed that the senses do not err. 9 
This phenomenon points to a potentially illustrative conundrum: how is 
it possible to taste at a distance? According to Lucretius, while DRN does 
not explicitly explain everything, it does offer one enough to work out 
the rest for oneself.10 In this way, apparently exceptional phenomena 
present opportunities to reveal further complexities of the processes 
which led to them. 11  This study thus reconstructs the physiological 
mechanisms underlying the sense of taste, with a view to explaining the 
salty taste of sea air and other instances of taste at a distance. In the pro-
cess, it also brings to bear evidence from Epicurean discussions of the 
water cycle. It argues that, in fact, the salty taste of sea air is no excep-
tion; rather, it is the apparently exceptional case that proves the rule, so 
to speak, with implications for our understanding of the Epicurean the-




5 See e.g. Sedley 2018: 68. On the close relationship between touch and taste in ancient 
thought more generally, see e.g. Weddle 2017: esp. 105-6, 118; Rudolph 2018a: 1-2; 
Rudolph 2018b: 45, 49, 51. 
6 For an overview of scholars who at times seem inclined to that interpretation, see 
Sedley 2018: 67-8, on whose contribution to the debate, see pp. 180-81 below. 
7 Schoenheim 1966; Rosenmeyer 1996. On what is meant by effluences, see pp. 153-56 
below. 
8 Schoenheim also cites the bitter taste we experience near the mixing of wormwood; 
Schoenheim 1966: 80, 86 n. 2; Rosenmeyer 1996: 144. For an overview of the state of 
the text in the second instance of these lines, see Bailey 1947: 3.1694. 
9 On the Epicurean belief in the reliability of the senses and their role in epistemology, 
see Lucr. DRN 4.478-99. Epic. RS 23, 24; Diog. Laert. 10.31-32. The bibliography on this 
subject is vast; see n. 1 above for some important contributions. 
10 Lucr. DRN 1.400-9. 
11 See e.g. pp. 194-97 below on the taste of honey, Koenen 2004 on the echo, and Glidden 
1979a: 168 on the role of the bizarre.  
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THE STATE OF THE QUESTION 
 
The sense of taste is a capacity of all living creatures. One of the tradi-
tional five senses of the body, Lucretius explicitly attributes it to both 
humans and animals. All are born with this essential property and from 
birth learn to use it through experience, in a process of trial and error. It 
generally helps one to seek suitable nutrition, avoid poison, and thus to 
survive.12 Lucretius’ main account of taste occurs in the fourth book of 
DRN, following the treatment of sight (4.54-378) and optical illusions 
(4.379-468), his refutation of skepticism and argument for the epistemic 
reliability of the senses (4.469-521), and the explanation of hearing 
(4.522-614). In brief, it proceeds as follows: 
 
4.615-16 Taste can be understood according to a logic similar to 
that which explains how the other senses work.13 
 
4.617-21 We experience taste in the mouth, via the tongue and 
palate. The flavor comes from food. 
 
4.622-26 When we taste different flavors, we also experience 
pleasure and pain, depending on the shapes of the par-
ticles involved. 
 
4.627-32 The pleasures of taste cease once ingestion occurs. Any 
food will suffice for nourishment, provided that it 
meets certain basic conditions. 
 




12 See e.g. Lucr. DRN 4.633-62, 823-59, 5.1032. The faculty of smell also aids in seeking 
food, avoiding poison, and survival; 4.684-86. 
13 These lines evoke and bring forward the sense of Lucr. DRN 4.522-23. See also 4.489-
96, 6.981-87. 
LUCRETIUS AND THE SALTY TASTE OF SEA AIR  177 
4.642-62 Different sorts of creatures experience the same food 
differently. This is due to differences in the creatures’ 
physical makeup.  
 
4.663-72 Similarly, when we are sick, things taste different to us 
than they usually do. 
 
Lucretius then moves on to the sense of smell (4.673-705). This much is 
fairly uncontroversial. The debate about taste primarily revolves around 
the details of the interpretation. Before presenting a more in-depth 
treatment than has thus far been attempted, a sketch of that debate is in 
order.  
Consideration of taste is often closely linked to that of touch, in both 
the ancient and modern discussions of Epicurean theory. As stated 
above, the traditional view is that both touch and taste operate through 
direct contact with the objects of their perception. Others have proposed 
an indirect contact mechanism. This idea has a history. Lucretius’ em-
phasis on tactus and on the role of contact in the materialist physics of 
the senses led some scholars to question whether all of the senses can be 
reductively explained by the sense of touch.14 Two of the advocates of 
this theory – that indeed they can be – are Schoenheim and Rosen-
meyer.15 Both also argue that touch is in fact the registering of contact 
specifically with various kinds of effluences, different sorts for the dif-
ferent senses; by their logic, taste is the registering by touch of contact 
with effluences of taste-bodies or flavor 16  However, Schoenheim 
acknowledges that with taste ‘[t]here are not normally effluences as 
such. It is the objects themselves we taste, even though we do squeeze 
 
14 See n. 5 above. 
15 Schoenheim 1966; Rosenmeyer 1996. Cf. Glidden 1979a: 177-78 n. 15; Furley 1993: 91-
92. 
16 Schoenheim 1966: esp. 74, 77, 81, 86 n. 2, 87; Rosenmeyer 1996: esp. 137-38, 140, 141-
42, 143. 
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the taste out of them’.17 She reaches a similar conclusion about the role 
of effluences in the sense of touch.18 Schoenheim nevertheless takes ‘the 
salty taste of sea water and the bitter one of wormwood, which we can 
perceive without actually drinking the water or eating the herb’ as evi-
dence for the role of effluences in all of the senses, at least in some 
cases.19 While Schoenheim treats taste in the context of her larger argu-
ments about touch, it is Rosenmeyer’s main topic and he considers it in 
far greater detail. He argues that chewing liberates effluences of flavor 
from food.20 These effluences, not the food, enter our passages and lead 
to taste.21  Thus all taste occurs at a distance from the source object, 
whether the relatively small distances in our mouths or the perceptible 
larger distance of ‘the salty flavor of the sea breeze’.22 In order to address 
their arguments, we must first consider what is meant by ‘effluence’. 
On one reading, effluents are simply bodies which flow out from a 
source object. Effluence refers collectively to a stream of effluents. Some 
effluents emanate continuously from the surface, as do simulacra, the ul-
tra-fine films that give rise to vision. They have the same shape and color 
as their source object, but do not share its other properties. Other efflu-
ents are emitted from deep within an object, like odors, sounds, and 
smoke.23 While simulacra, sounds, and odors are microscopic, one can see 
smoke.24 The simulacra, odors, and sounds are intermediary stimuli that 
 
17 Schoenheim 1966: 80. 
18 Schoenheim 1966: 85. 
19 Schoenheim 1966: 80, 86 n. 2. 
20 Rosenmeyer 1996: esp. 137-40. Rosenmeyer uses the terms effluence, film, and simu-
lacra to refer to the same entities; Rosenmeyer 1996: 135 n. 4. 
21 Rosenmeyer 1996: 138-39, 143-44. 
22 Rosenmeyer 1996: 138, 144. Cf. e.g. Asmis 1984: 111. 
23 On the positions in the source objects from which these effluences are emitted, see 
e.g. Lucr. DRN 4.90-97, 694-97. That simulacra do not replicate the structure of the 
object beyond the arrangement of constitutents on its surface, see 4.65-71, 87-89, 
110-11, 196. 
24 Lucr. DRN 4.54-126, 143-46; Epic. Ep. Hdt. 47-48. See also Bailey 1947: 3.1694. 
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– barring distortion – allow us to perceive certain properties of the thing 
from which they originated by preserving some continuity with the rel-
evant aspects of that object’s nature.25 Smoke, on the other hand, is an 
example of effluents that do not function as intermediaries and have a 
nature fundamentally distinct from that of their source object. On this 
minimal reading, it seems plausible to hold, as for example Bailey does, 
that effluences of some sort could be involved in the salty taste of sea air 
– whether or not they are involved in taste more generally.26 Other in-
terpretations of ‘effluence’ exist as well. For example, Schoenheim sug-
gests that the effluents particular to their respective senses are minia-
tures of the original objects, with the partial exception, as noted above, 
of the effluences that cause touch and taste.27 According to Rosenmeyer, 
the emitted particles involved in sight transmit the structure of the 
source object, but those involved in hearing, smell, taste, and perhaps 
certain kinds of touch, are identical to their source objects, as micro-
scopic replicas or extensions thereof.28 Atomic vibration within an object 
or πάλσις is generally thought to be the proximate cause of certain emis-
sions, like the emission of simulacra. Rosenmeyer takes πάλσις to be the 
 
25 Simulacra, more specifically, preserve the color and shape of an object (or at least the 
shape of its color) and thereby allow one to perceive those properties of the object. 
Odors do not begin from a single larger particle of odor, but are sent forth as they 
form, preserving and transmitting the scent of the source. A sound is emitted from 
an object as a single particle, which breaks up into smaller but otherwise identical 
particles, allowing the perception of the original sound. They also preserve and en-
able perception of part of the nature of their source. It is in a thing’s nature to make 
particular sorts of sounds and not others, as with the different sorts of sounds that 
creatures of different species are capable of making. It is also in a thing’s nature to 
make sounds that consistently have certain characteristics, as with the distinctive-
ness of the voices of different individuals that features in voice identification. 
26 Bailey 1947: 3.1208-10, 1694; cf. 3.1253. Other scholars who seem to share this mini-
malist interpretation include Sedley (1989: 126) and Furley (1993: 83-84, 91-92). 
27 Schoenheim 1966: 74, 78, 86 n. 2. 
28 Rosenmeyer 1996: 135-37, 144, 146-49.  
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cause of all effluences.29 While Koenen is inclined to view vision and ol-
faction as involving such ‘automatical’ or involuntary emissions, she 
views hearing and taste as generally involving ‘non-automatical emis-
sions’, or emissions which living creatures cause deliberately. She sug-
gests, however, that automatical emissions might be involved in the taste 
of liquid and the salty taste of sea air.30 Nevertheless, as Koenen notes, in 
Lucretius’ actual explanations of hearing (DRN 4.522-614) and taste (DRN 
4.615-72), he makes no reference to effluences, i.e. to a flowing away of 
particles involved in those sensory processes.31  
These scholars have raised a series of related questions about what 
taste actually is for the Epicureans: What exactly does one perceive? 
What is the relationship between that thing and the sense of taste? Is any 
contact with the thing itself or with bodies that flow from it? If the latter, 
are those bodies fundamentally like their source, and where do they 
come from? How does one come into contact with what one perceives? 
What part of the body does – in other words, what is the sense organ of 
taste? How does that lead to the experience of taste? And, finally, do we 
contribute anything to those perceptions? These questions will be ad-
dressed in context. First it will be useful to return to the issue of touch. 
The Epicurean account of the universe is materialistic: the universe is 
comprised of bodies and void, their properties, and the interactions of 
these entities – interactions such as the collision of atoms zinging about 
in space. Lucretius uses the word tactus to signify contact, as well as a 
number of ideas and processes that involve bodies touching each other. 
Nevertheless, as Sedley notes, Lucretius distinguishes between touch as 
a sense involving contact and touch as contact itself. Sedley also argues 
that Lucretius understands a further duality within the former: internal 
 
29 Rosenmeyer 1996: 136, 146-48. 
30 Koenen 1997: 166.  
31 Koenen 1997: 165-66. See also Rosenmeyer 1996: 149. 
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touch and external touch – a distinction that seems shared by the Epicu-
rean author of PHerc. 19/698, who may have been Philodemus. Accord-
ing to Sedley, internal touch is the body’s capacity for awareness of cer-
tain states and changes within it, including some from which pleasure 
and pain arise. The body thus shares with the other sense organs the abil-
ity to sense its own internal state. External touch is the body’s capacity 
for awareness of contact with things that are adjacent to or penetrating 
it.32 The ‘touching of touching’ (tactus ... tactūs, DRN 2.434), then, is ‘an 
awareness, by the tactile sense, of direct corporeal contact’ with or within 
the body. This capacity for ‘internal tactile awareness of contact’ is the 
sensory faculty of the body, as body, that we call the sense of touch.33 It 
follows that, while all the senses operate through contact (whether di-
rect or indirect via contact with intermediaries), their perceptions do 
not necessarily entail the registering of all instances of contact by the 
tactile sense.34 Therefore, they cannot be reductively explained by the 
sense of touch.  
The distinctions with which Sedley analyzes touch can also advance 
the discussion of taste. For the remainder of this article, unless quoting 
another, I use the term ‘sensory faculty of taste’ when referring to the 
ability we generally call ‘the sense of taste’; a manifestation of that fac-
ulty that is our phenomenal experience, I call ‘the perception of x’ 
(where x is what one registers awareness of), ‘an instance of taste’, or 
‘the sensation of taste’. All of these expressions use an appositional gen-
itive. With ‘the mechanism of taste’, I refer to how the faculty achieves 
perceptions; a ‘sense organ of taste’ is a site where that process and the 
sensations that seem to arise from it occur. The ‘object of perception’ is 
the thing whose properties one seems to perceive phenomenally; a 
 
32 Sedley 1989: 126, 129-32. Sedley 2018: esp. 64-72. See also Glidden 1979a: 161-63. 
33 Sedley 2018: 72.  
34 Sedley 2018: esp. 67-74. 
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‘sense object’ or ‘intermediary’ is a stimulus which is different in nature 
but whose properties at some underlying level make possible that phe-
nomenal perception. At times, the object of perception is also called ‘the 
source object’ or ‘source’. When I simply use ‘taste’, I do so generally. I 
apply the same conventions in discussing the other sensory faculties and 
the perceptions associated with them. 
THE MECHANISM 
 
What taste is and how taste works are closely bound up for Lucretius. He 
begins his account in book four by characterizing taste as the feeling or 
perception of sucus. He then goes on to describe how sucus is produced 
when one eats (DRN 4.615-21): 
 
nec, qui sentimus sucum, lingua atque palatum 
plusculum habent in se rationis plus operaeve. 
principio sucum sentimus in ore, cibum cum 
mandendo exprimimus, ceu plenam spongiam aquaï  
siquis forte manu premere ac siccare coëpit.  
inde quod exprimimus per caulas omne palati 
diditur et rarae per flexa foramina linguae.35 
 
Nor do the tongue and palate, by which we perceive sucus, require the 
least bit more argument or effort to explain themselves. Firstly, we 
feel sucus in the mouth when we squeeze the food by chewing it, just 
as if by chance someone begins to press and to drain dry a sponge full 
of water with the hand. Then all that we squeeze out is distributed 
 
35 Quotations from De rerum natura follow the Latin text of Rouse & Smith 1992. 
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through the openings of the palate and through the winding passages 
of the porous tongue. 
 
On one reading, sucus is a liquid substance that comes from food (cibus) 
because of mastication. The analogy with squeezing water from a sponge 
suggests it is mastication that releases sucus from the food. Saliva does 
not seem to be involved.36 In conjunction with the nearby mention of liq-
uid in the mouth (4.624), the analogy confirms that sucus is liquid. It is 
therefore likely that one operative meaning of the word is ‘juice’. This is 
its primary signification in the Latin language and throughout DRN, 
though its full meaning is somewhat more complicated, as we shall see.37 
The repetition of exprimimus and its root premo in three successive lines 
emphasize that chewing food includes squeezing it – perhaps indeed 
juicing it. While the teeth doing the squeezing are not explicitly men-
tioned in the way that the hand is, line 4.615 may be evoking them with 
its heavy spondees. With respect to mirroring, the concentration of eli-
sions in the opening five lines is also worth noting.38 Taken together, 
they seem to support the view that the sensory faculty of taste operates 
through direct contact between the parts of one’s mouth and the food, 
at least on a phenomenal level. Given the tendency for correspondence 
 
36 Lucretius is not unaware of its existence. It is mentioned twice in the poem, once in 
the context of food as being poisonous to snakes (Lucr. DRN 4.638), and once in the 
context of kissing (4.1108); on the latter, see Rudolph 2018a: 16-17. Perhaps Lucretius 
views it as something which we generally produce in the mouth in anticipation of 
consuming food or drink, which then aids in swallowing it. 
37 See sucus, OLD and pp. 193-97 below. Scholars working on DRN generally translate 
sucus as juice, flavor, or taste; see e.g. Bailey 1947: 3.1254-55; Godwin 1986: 45, 130; 
Rosenmeyer 1996: 138. 
38 The elisions are: lingua atque (Lucr. DRN 4.615), plusculum habent (4.616), mandendo 
exprimimus (4.618), spongiam aquaï (4.618), premere ac (4.619). See also Bailey 1947: 
3.1255; Godwin 1986: 130. 
PAMELA ZINN  184 
between the perceptible and the imperceptible, the reader can reasona-
bly expect that there is also direct contact on the microlevel.39 These 
lines depict what they describe in other respects as well, clarifying their 
meaning. In 4.618-19, mandendo exprimimus and premere ac highlight the 
action of pressing on something by embodying it; spongiam aquaï, in turn, 
mirrors the initial physical intertwining of and connection between the 
food and its sucus.40 Moreover, the reader, if reading aloud, is pressing 
out auditory representations of these textual phenomena. Indeed, men-
tioning the effort of the lingua to explain itself may well have encouraged 
reading aloud. In the explanation of hearing and sound production just 
beforehand, lingua signifies the tongue and speech; the use of exprimimus 
also echoes it. The reader is thus likely to be particularly attuned to the 
auditory experience.41 This trend continues in lines 4.620-21 by mirror-
ing with the use of hyperbaton. Here the phenomena are represented 
visually, and the reader can apply the understanding gained from the 
preceding explanation of sight. Quod and omne are distributed to the first 
and fifth feet, respectively, and the placement of omne illustrates that the 
sucus is per caulas ... palati. Similarly, the substance’s distribution per flexa 
foramina is bracketed by rarae ... linguae. Both constructions mimic the po-
rousness of the tongue and palate, a subject to which we shall return 
shortly. These lines may also illustrate, as Godwin suggests, the winding 
path of the sucus (as juice) as it is absorbed.42 The repetition of per high-
lights both the absorption and its pervasiveness. Lucretius thus inscribes 
into the very structure of lines 4.617-21 how the sucus comes into the 
 
39 On this tendency, see e.g. Schrivers 1978; Schiesaro 1990. 
40 The particles of sucus are likely dispersed throughout the food, like the water in the 
sponge, not necessarily just deep-seated, like bodies of odor; for further discussion, 
see pp. 187-88 below. For the view that they are deep-seated, see Bailey 1947: 3.1253-
55, following Robin. 
41 On Lucretius’ use of exprimo and on his use of the auditory potential of the text for 
philosophical disambiguation, see Zinn 2018: 132 and 138-39, 146, respectively. 
42 Godwin 1986: 130. 
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apertures and entrances, the passages and inlets, of the tongue and pal-
ate. The knowledge of the senses discussed beforehand, if applied, would 
prime the reader for this explanation and facilitate it. So, we perceive 
sucus when it is released from the food by chewing and the juice enters 
the pores of our tongue and palate. Their passages must then interact 
with the juice in a way that gives rise to perception. Before we turn to 
that perception and the other potential meanings of sucus, let us consider 
the sense organs in more detail. 
As we have seen, Lucretius identifies both the tongue and the palate 
as sense organs of taste.43 He emphasizes this in various ways. Lucretius 
foregrounds them in the first line of his explanation. There, their role in 
perceiving sucus is confirmed by qui, which refers to both, and they serve 
together as subject of habent, indicating their common or shared action.44 
The elision in the expression which introduces them, lingua atque pala-
tum, as well as the parallelisms in the pleonastic prepositional phrases of 
4.620-1, perhaps further illustrate their common function. So might the 
partial chiastic echo of 4.615 in 617, particularly if one takes in ore to refer 
to them collectively by synecdoche. Even today we speak of one’s palate 
as a metonymy for that individual’s particular taste or discernment. 
Then too palatum evoked both physical taste and psychological prefer-
ence. The vault of the mouth was also associated with the vault of the 
heavens.45 Lucretius may in fact have a multivalent meaning of palatum 
 
43 Today we add the pharynx to these and focus on receptors on the surface, like the 
taste buds on the tongue and palate, rather than thinking in terms of pores and pas-
sages. For an overview of modern, scientific approaches to the study of taste, see 
Rudolph 2018a: 5. 
44 It may also refer back to Lucretius’ explanation of sound production in the immedi-
ately preceding account of hearing. The tongue and lips feature prominently in that 
mechanism. However, it is not implausible that Lucretius may also have been aware 
of the role of the palate in the production of some sounds. There are references to it 
among his Roman contemporaries; see palatum, OLD §1c. 
45 See palatum, OLD; Cic. ND 2.18.49. That association is activated, if not reinforced, by 
Lucretius’ use of templa at 4.624, even though the word seems to have a different 
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in mind throughout his account of taste, encompassing a range of its lit-
eral and figurative uses. In his view, both the tongue and palate play an 
important role in the mechanism of taste. As rarae ... linguae (4.621) re-
minds us, the distinction between each sense organs’ apparent surface 
and its inner passages may be somewhat spurious. All assemblages con-
tain void; the amount depends on how closely their constituent bodies 
are interlocked and – in the larger, more complex assemblages – on their 
internal and external structures. Thus, all seemingly solid macroscopic 
bodies are actually porous, and, through some of these pores, they have 
the potential to emit and receive matter.46 These bodies include living 
creatures.47 Every living thing is both unique and of a kind; moreover, all 
creatures are both made up of many different constituents and have 
many constituents in common.48 To the extent that creatures differ in 
appearance and nature, their constitutions also differ, including the pas-
sages with which their bodies are riddled.49 The sense organs of taste are 
a particularly telling example (DRN 4.649-51, 655-62): 
 
semina cum porro distent, differe necessest 
intervalla viasque, foramina quae perhibemus, 
omnibus in membris et in ore ipsoque palato. 
... 
namque figurarum ratio ut motusque reposcunt, 
proinde foraminibus debent differre figurae, 
et variare viae proinde ac textura coercet.  
 
primary meaning in that context; see pp. 187-91 below. Compare templum, OLD §1, 
4c. See also Bailey 1947: 3.1255. 
46 See e.g. Lucr. DRN 1.329-69, 483-97, 511-17, 532-37, 565-76, 2.100-8, 4.90-94, 6.936-58, 
981-97, 1009-11, 1034-39, 1084-86.  
47 Lucr. DRN 4.858-76. 
48 Lucr. DRN 1.584-98, 2.342-51, 583-88, 661-72, 4.642-48, 6.981-87, 1034-36. 
49 Lucr. DRN  2.718-29, 4.645-72 (on which, see below).  
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hoc ubi quod suave est aliis aliis fit amarum,  
illi, cui suave est, levissima corpora debent  
contractabiliter caulas intrare palati 
at contra quibus est eadem res intus acerba, 
aspera nimirum penetrant hamataque fauces. 
 
Furthermore, since the seeds differ, it is necessary that the gaps and 
pathways, which we call passages, differ in all of the members and in 
the mouth and the palate itself ... For indeed as the configuration and 
motions of the seeds’ shapes require, the shapes of the passages ought 
to differ accordingly, and the pathways ought to vary accordingly, as 
the structure compels. By this, when what is sweet to some happens 
to be bitter to others: for that one to whom it is sweet, very smooth 
bodies ought to enter the openings of the palate in a caressing man-
ner, but, on the other hand, to those for whom the same thing inside 
is acerbic, doubtless rough and hooked bodies penetrate the inlets. 
 
Lucretius thus accounts for our different tastes, i.e. what foods different 
creatures find preferable and even suitable.50 In short, the shapes of one’s 
passages influence what sorts of bodies enter and by this influence our 
perception.  
The constitution of the tongue and palate is worth treating in further 
detail. Lucretius uses the palate as the exemplar (4.651, 660), coordinate 
with its figurative meaning as the organ of discernment, while confirm-
ing the generalizability of his remarks. 51  Lines 4.652-62 elaborate on 
4.649-51. In lines 4.655-57, Lucretius presents a two-fold concept of pas-
sage shape: the shape of the channel, which affects what can fit through 
 
50 Lucr. DRN 4.633-41, 6.970-78. 
51 On the figurative meanings of palatum, see pp. 185-86 above. The generalizability to 
the tongue and the rest of the body, including the other sense organs, is confirmed 
by omnibus in membris et in ore ipsoque palato, Lucr. DRN 4.651. 
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it, and the shape of the route that would be traced by whatever journeys 
through it.52 With respect to the shape of a channel, there is a further 
duality. Lucretius often uses the same word to refer to both the passages 
and their points of entry, as here with fauces (4.662), as well as with caulae 
and foramen throughout the account of taste.53 While some passages may 
seem well-suited to admit bodies of particular shapes and sizes, this is 
not just a matter of square pegs and round holes, so to speak. A roundish 
channel of a particular size could potentially admit a smaller body with 
a spikey or angular shape. The shape of a given channel also is not nec-
essarily regular, much less the same as the shape of its entrance.54 More-
over, these shapes are not necessarily stable; they may change, for ex-
ample, with illness.55 These considerations suggest that there are not 
particular pores for sweet and others for bitter and that which bodies 
one interacts with on any given occasion of tasting is influenced by a host 
of factors, including the make-up of both the perceiver and the object of 
perception. The passages are also not necessarily distinct pathways that 
progress in a more or less linear fashion from the surface towards some 
destination, like a series of traffic tunnels under a river. Rather, as flexa 
foramina (4.621) earlier and ac textura coercet (4.657) here may imply, the 
porousness of these sense organs could best be described as a three-di-
mensional web, a myriad of passages of various description – woven to-
gether into networks and not entirely interconnected. They are intricate 
 
52 Lucr. DRN 4.655-57. 
53 The device of synecdoche supports this, of course, and sometimes the distinction is 
even moot in context. See fauces OLD §1, 3, 4. For other views, see Bailey 1947: 3.1259; 
Godwin 1986: 132; Rouse & Smith 1992: 328. In light of Lucr. DRN 4.622-29, it is un-
likely that Lucretius is referring at 4.662 to the throat, although that is the primary 
meaning of fauces at 4.628. 
54 See Lucr. DRN 2.381-97, 4.652-54 especially modis multis (4.654).  
55 Lucr. DRN 4.663-72. It is conceivable that illness may change the number of passages, 
the identity of the passages, or just the shape in which their perimeters are config-
ured (keeping how many and which are open to interaction). 
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routes with many potential twists, turns, and choke points; some even 
lack an opening to the world beyond the body.56 Here, with intrare, intus, 
and penetrant (4.661-62), Lucretius stresses the penetration of the pas-
sages more than before, with diditur per ... per (4.620-21), which the echo 
of caulas ... palati also recalls. Lines 4.652-62 also point to parallels be-
tween the mechanism of taste and other sensory mechanisms. To the ex-
tent that passages serve as a filter, allowing some things to pass through 
and not others, the particular selectivity of one’s passages is not specific 
to the tongue and palate; each of the sense organs is open to interacting 
with its own sorts of stimuli.57 In the mechanism of sight, for example, 
simulacra penetrate the pupils of the eyes (4.331, 719); in that of hearing, 
auditory stimuli insinuate themselves into or otherwise penetrate the 
ears (4.525, 544, 613), and, in smell, olfactory stimuli, the nostrils (2.415, 
683). That of touch may also at times work this way (2.434-35); with mac-
roscopic entities, at least, the mechanism seems to generally involve the 
outermost surface of the body, not its passages, as shown by the sensory 
threshold for external touch.58 In at least four of these senses, then, the 
contact that leads to perception involves the penetration of suitable 
 
56 Compare Lucr. DRN 4.90-94, 599-602.  
57 Lucr. DRN 2.680-87, 4.489-96, 6.981-87. See also Epic. Ep. Hdt. 49-53; Plut. Adv. Col. 
1109a-1110d; Asmis 1984: 115-17. Thus, sounds have no taste, so to speak, although 
they are pressed out through the throat, passed through the mouth, and shaped by 
the tongue. On the mechanism of sound production and the senses’ respective 
spheres of discrimination, see n. 1 above. 
58 Evidence for the sensory threshold for external touch comes in part from micro-
scopic bodies that are felt collectively like a blow to the exterior surface of the body 
or stubbing one’s toe on a rock, as with wind and cold; Lucr. DRN 4.259-68. For an-
other interpretation, see Rosenmeyer 1996: 137. It also comes from macroscopic ob-
jects whose contact is not registered by the sensory faculty of touch, such as dust, 
cobwebs, and feathers. It seems that, due to their size and/or lightness, they do not 
stir perception-bearing motion (sensifer motus) in the particles of the anima dispersed 
throughout the flesh; Lucr. DRN 3.374-95. 
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stimuli into the passages of the body. Wherever those instances of con-
tact occur, whether contact with an intermediary or with the object it-
self, that site seems to be identified as the sense organ. Thus, for Lucre-
tius, the tongue and palate are the sense organs of taste in that the inter-
actions which give rise to their perceptions occur in their passages and 
the shape of those passages at least partly determines which particles 
these sense organs are likely to interact with.59  
The interactions reveal more about the mechanism. They occur once 
the sucus and the passages meet (DRN 4.622-26):60 
 
hoc ubi levia sunt manantis corpora suci, 
suaviter attingunt et suaviter omnia tractant 
umida linguai circum sudantia templa.  
at contra pungunt sensum lacerantque coorta, 
quanto quaeque magis sunt asperitate repleta.  
 
By this, when the bodies of the flowing sucus are smooth, sweetly they 
touch upon and sweetly they stroke everything around the moist 
dripping regions of the tongue. But, in contrast, the bodies that attack 
our sense prick and tear, each in proportion to their roughness. 
 
 
These lines establish the fundamentals of how the interactions work at 
the level of microscopic assemblages and structures, priming the reader 
for the development of the ideas at 4.658-62. Comparing these two parts 
of his account, Lucretius emphasizes the tongue and palate each in turn, 
with his use of linguai at 4.624 and palato at 4.660; the parallels between 
their passages and the structure and functions of these organs suggest 
 
59 See also Lucr. DRN 4.706-21. 
60 See Lucr. DRN 4.620-21 above. 
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that each may also refer to the other by metonymy. The content and 
words of 4.622-26 and 4.658-62 not only resonate with each other, they 
also recall and bring to bear an earlier account of the relevance of stim-
ulus shape to perception, within which taste features prominently: 
2.398-443. 61  As Friedländer and Synder have shown, Lucretius choses 
words that illustrate the shape of what they name through the pattern 
of their sounds.62 Through DRN 2.398-443, 4.622-26, and 4.658-62, taken 
together, Lucretius shows that the shape of the stimulus not only affects 
whether or not it can interact but also the nature of the interaction. Both 
at the entrances and within the passages, smooth bodies of sucus make 
contact of a gentle touching or stroking nature.63 This gives rise to the 
perception of sweetness, which is pleasurable; the anaphora of suaviter 
(4.623) signifies both.64 Rough bodies of sucus make contact that pricks or 
tears (4.625), depending on whether their shape is just rough or also 
hooked. The chiastic presentation at 4.622-6 highlights the contrast be-
tween the smooth and rough bodies and their respective sorts of inter-
actions.65  In fact, the echoing sections of the accounts are structured 
around similar contrasts, most also introduced by at contra.66 The reader 
 
61 This account is itself a key exemplum in Lucretius’ larger proof of the diversity of 
the shapes and sizes of the atoms or first-beginnings, comprising Lucr. DRN 2.333-
477. 
62 Friedländer 1941: 358-63; Snyder 1980: 91-92. 
63 For contact by gentle touching, see tango and its compounds: iucunde tangere Lucr. 
DRN 2.403, attingunt 4.623. For contact by caressing, see tracto and its compounds: 
tractentur 2.399, tractant 4.623, contractabiliter 4.660. Lucretius often uses tracto and its 
compounds to indicate a sort of caressing motion, i.e. stimulation by stroking; see 
tracto, OLD §1, 2; Bailey 1947: 3.1259; Godwin 1986: 132. 
64 See also iucunde tangere Lucr. DRN 2.403. 
65 The arrangement is: stimulus shape, nature of physical interaction, location, nature 
of physical interaction, stimulus shape. It is perhaps no coincidence that circum (all 
around) occupies the central position. 
66 Lucr. DRN 2.398-401 (at contra 400), 402-7 (at contra 404), 422-25 (at contra 424), 426-30 
(sunt etiam ... sed magis – which, by variation, illustrates the phenomenon), 4.658-62 
(at contra 661). 
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thus knows that 4.625-26 refers to two kinds of roughness. In book two, 
Lucretius states that when things are made from barb-like constituents, 
ones that have hooks with sharp, curved points, they tear their way into 
the body. This gives rise to some variety of harsh sensation, like the per-
ception of a sour, bitter, or even repugnantly foul flavor, which is implied 
to be painful. However, when they are made from somewhat jagged con-
stituents, i.e. ones with small angles that jut out a bit, there is a kind of 
tickling contact that stimulates perceptions of another sort, like of 
acidic, spicy, sharp, or otherwise tingly flavors.67 Lines 4.625-26 indicate 
that this pointy sort also have the potential to be unpleasant, perhaps 
depending on the degree of their roughness.68 In the elaboration of 4.626 
at 4.662, the elements of aspera ... hamataque should thus be understood 
both on their own and as a hendiadys: ‘rough bodies and hooked bodies’ 
and ‘bodies that are roughly hooked’.69 Lucretius therefore conceives of 
sweet and bitter as opposite ends of the flavor spectrum; there are other 
possibilities in between.70  
Lines 4.615-26 also provide evidence for Lucretius’ views on the speed 
of the interactions. His use of temporal clauses, adverbs, and participles 
reflects the apparent simultaneity of the perception of sucus and the un-
derlying interactions with the bodies of sucus. These also seem to coin-
cide with the perceptions of pleasure and pain; that implication at 2.398-
407 and 2.422-30 is confirmed by 4.627-29, where Lucretius states that 
the pleasure from the sucus ends at the boundary of the palate, i.e. upon 
ingestion, the end of the process or mechanism of taste. The apparent 
 
67 See esp. Lucr. DRN 2.398-407, 422-30, 461-70. 
68 Compare Lucr. DRN 2.470. 
69 See also levibus atque rutundis Lucr. DRN 2.402, and the echoing lines 2.404 and 2.424 
where the constructions mirror the phenomenon of interlocking constituents met-
rically as well as when taken as instances of hendiadys. 
70 On ancient and modern thought about the ‘basic tastes’ and the range of possible 
‘tastes’, see Rudolph 2018a: 4-5. 
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coincidence of pleasure and pain with different sorts of contact – con-
tact, that is, between the bodies of sucus and the passages of the tongue 
and palate – supports the argument that all of the sense organs are able 
to register awareness of their own internal states.71 That said, distribu-
tion, penetrating, colliding, stroking, pricking, tearing, and ingesting are 
themselves processes.72 All take some amount of time. If the perception 
of sucus occurs when one chews the food, with no apparent delay, and 
potentially lasts until the sucus is ingested, with no apparent lingering, 
then one’s sensations and the interactions underlying them must only 
seem to coincide, and each interaction of the mechanism must occur 
much faster than the speed at which perception arises.73 
Now, to what precisely does quod exprimimus (4.620) refer, and what 
are these corpora suci (4.622)? What is the experience to which Lucretius 
refers when he says sentimus sucum? According to Lucretius, atoms or 
first-beginnings lack certain properties generally possessed by larger, 
perceptible assemblages. The first-beginnings of things, being actually 
solid as well as immutable and indestructible, do not give off or break up 
into smaller bodies.74 They are therefore dry of juice (suco ieiuna 2.845) 
and have no sapor of their own to contribute to the properties of assem-
blages.75 This is the first instance of sucus in DRN. In the last, Lucretius 
characterizes sapor as originating from sucus.76 So far it would seem that 
 
71 See p. 181 above. The ability of the tongue and palate to register both the different 
sorts of contact and their own internal state may approach our notions of mouth-
feel, excepting the contribution of aroma, which Lucretius does not seem to admit. 
Our contemporary discourse on taste sometimes approaches one’s experience of 
food and drink through the vector of mouth-feel and there are multiple interpreta-
tions of the concept; see Rudolph 2018a: 5. 
72 With respect to pleasure and pain, see also Lucr. DRN 2.963-66. 
73 On the speed of our perception of time relative to other sensory mechanisms, see 
Zinn 2016. 
74 See e.g. Lucr. DRN 1.169-71, 215-24, 234, 483-502, 2.842-64. 
75 Lucr. DRN 1.778-81, 2.583-88, 854-59. 
76 Lucr. DRN 6.986-87. 
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Lucretius uses sucus for juice and sapor for flavor, a property (apparently) 
of food or drink at the phenomenal level, registered by the sensory fac-
ulty of taste. But Lucretius also uses sucus to refer to both the fluid and 
flavor at once, as he seems to at 4.615 and possibly 4.617.77 He also occa-
sionally uses sapor this way, as perhaps with sorsum sapor insinuatur | sen-
sibus.78 Moreover, at 4.627-29 sucus must mean flavor, because, although 
one no longer experiences flavor once one ingests and distributes a nu-
tritive substance, one still experiences pleasure if and as one’s constitu-
tion is restored by that substance.79 Nevertheless, it is those substances 
which have a pleasurable flavor that one tends to pursue.80 Just as sucus 
can refer to juice and, by metonymy, to the flavor whose perception it 
gives rise to, so too sapor can refer not only to flavor, but also to the sen-
sory faculty that perceives it. It is as the sensory faculty of taste, for ex-
ample, that sapor oris (4.487, 494) helps to establish the epistemic relia-
bility of the senses.81 The one instance of sapor in Lucretius’ account of 
taste comes at the end, where he demonstrates the validity of his mech-
anistic arguments through their potential to make sense of a common 
epistemological explanandum: the paradoxically bitter flavor of honey 
during illness.82 Generally speaking, when honey is in one’s mouth, it has 
a sweet, pleasurable flavor.83 As we have seen, this means that round, 
 
77 Lucr. DRN 3.216-30, esp. 223, 226. 
78 Lucr. DRN 2.684-85. On insinuo in DRN, see Farrell 1988: esp. 183-84. 
79 Lucr. DRN 1.350-57, 2.711-19, 963-72, 4.858-76, 4.1091-93. 
80 Hence, despite Lucretius’ assurance that the sort of food does not matter beyond 
serving its nutritive function, one still administers the medicinal, bitter wormwood 
in a cup rimmed with honey; Lucr. DRN 1.936-42, 4.11-17, 630-32. The scholarly liter-
ature on the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain in Epicureanism is vast; for a 
recent overview of the subject, see Woolf 2009. 
81 Lucr. DRN 4.469-521. See also, e.g. 2.510. 
82 Lucr. DRN 4.663-72. For other ancient attempts to deal with this paradox, see e.g. 
Bailey 1947: 3.1260; Godwin 1986: 132; Rouse & Smith 1992: 328. 
83 Lucr. DRN 1.938, 2.398-99, 2.505, 4.13. 
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smooth bodies are entering the passages of the tongue and palate.84 Lu-
cretius tells us that when one is sick, one’s constitution sometimes un-
dergoes changes that can affect perception (DRN 4.668-72):85 
 
fit prius ad sensum ut quae corpora conveniebant  
nunc non conveniant, et cetera sint magis apta, 
quae penetrata queunt sensum progignere acerbum; 
utraque enim sunt in mellis commixta sapore – 
id quod iam supera tibi saepe ostendimus ante.  
  
It happens that the bodies which were previously suited for feeling 
now do not fit, and that the rest are more apt, those which, when they 
have penetrated the sense organ, are able to produce an acerbic sen-
sation. For both [sorts of bodies] have been mixed together in the sa-
por of honey – a thing which above I have already shown you often 
before. 
 
Here Lucretius employs words and constructions with a plurality of 
meanings. The expression ad sensum functions together with the polyp-
toton of convenio as well as with apta. These simultaneously signify the 
bodies’ coming together with the sense organ, their physical (in)congru-
ity with its passages, and their (un)suitability for causing feeling.86 In 
4.670, sensum is sylleptic, signifying both the sense organ (whether the 
 
84 According to Lucretius, the constituents of honey are not so smooth, round, or light 
as those of water, which is also sweet; therefore it is more viscous than water. Lucr. 
DRN 3.189-202. 
85 See p. 188 above. 
86 In DRN, Lucretius uses sensus to mean a range of things, sometimes simultaneously, 
including sensation, the sense organs, and the senses or sensory faculties. See e.g. 
Glidden 1979a: 155. I hope to develop this further in a subsequent study. 
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tongue or palate) that is penetrated by these other bodies and the unu-
sual feeling to which these interactions give rise. Lucretius highlights the 
fact that he has already demonstrated the logic behind this by simulta-
neously stating and depicting it, with the pleonasm interspersed 
throughout last line, iam supera ... saepe ... ante; this synchysis perhaps 
serves as also a visual mnemonic of the sorts of bodies in question, imi-
tating their characteristic interlocking – and thus evoking the hooked 
shapes which lead both to interlocking and to the perception of a harsh 
or bitter flavor, which the reader now knows is painful.87 These lines thus 
show that perception is affected by the issue of fit, with respect to size 
and shape. The bodies of sucus which used to enter the sense organ no 
longer fit, but now the rest (cetera) – i.e. those which usually do not fit – 
are better suited to the passages and thus for causing sensation. Under 
those circumstances one experiences different perceptions. The flavor of 
honey thus has the potential to be experienced as either sweet and 
thereby pleasurable or as bitter and thereby painful due to honey’s 
mixed composition, with sapor mellis signifying both. As we have seen, 
different creatures experience the same foods differently because their 
passages are open to interactions with different constituents.88 Similarly, 
we perceive flavor differently when our passages have changed signifi-
cantly. Confirming 4.659-62, then, bitter and sweet are real, not conven-
tions; they are two potential perceptions of the flavor of the very same 
thing (eadem res).89 Which sensations one experiences thus depends to 
some extent on what one contributes to the process. It is telling that the 
one time the expression corpora suci occurs is in the context of the mech-
anism of taste. Because one’s constitution influences which bodies are 
selected for interaction and, by this, how one experiences the property 
 
87 Lucr. DRN 2.398-407 (esp. 404-5), 422-30. 
88 Lucr. DRN 4.633-63. See pp. 186-90 above. 
89 Following Epicurus, contra Democritus and the Sceptics. Democritus B9 (SE M. 7.135) 
DK; Sedley 1983: 33; Long & Sedley 1987: 1.37; Wardy 1988; Warren 2002: 7-9, 193-94. 
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of flavor, the expression is pointed. As sucus is quod exprimimus, thus cor-
pora suci may be read both as a periphrasis and not. As a periphrasis, it 
nevertheless emphasizes the salient aspect of the thing to which the ex-
pression refers – namely, the constituent bodies of the juice that, 
through their interactions, give rise to the perception of flavor.90  
Until the discussion of honey, the account of taste has been concerned 
with cibus, apparently as what we might call ‘solid food’.91 Honey is a liq-
uid.92 Lucretius divides all food into two categories: dry (or solid) food 
and liquid food.93 Thus, unless otherwise specified, one should read cibus 
as signifying ‘nutritive substance’ – more precisely, ‘assemblage contain-
ing some potentially nutritive constituents’ –  and any comments about 
cibus should be understood to apply to both solids and liquids.94 Given 
these things, the mechanism of tasting liquids should somehow be self-
evidently contained in the broader account of tasting food. We will re-
turn to this shortly. For the time being, let us simply note that one can 
perceive the flavor of liquids. 
SEAWATER AND THE WATER CYCLE 
 
Brackish rain was a recognized phenomenon in antiquity. Both it and the 
salty flavor of seawater were explananda of paradoxography at least as 
 
90 Lucretius often uses periphrases in this way. 
91 Of course, ‘solid’ food is a bit of a misnomer, given that all assemblages contain void; 
on which, see p. 186 above. 
92 See Lucr. DRN 1.938, 4.13. The periphrasis mellis liquore emphasizes the bodies which 
would give rise to the perception of a sweet, pleasurable flavor, which is pertinent 
in these contexts. 
93 Lucr. DRN 1.809, 859-65, esp. 864. For examples, see 2.390, 661-68.  
94 Only some of their constituents are nutritive, i.e. fit for constructive incorporation 
by a given creature once ingested and absorbed. See e.g. Lucr. DRN 2.661-99, esp. 661-
68 and 677-79, 709-17, 4.633-41, 865-76. 
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far back as Aristotle.95 There was also a tradition of Roman writing about 
water. Topics included the composition of water, which sorts were ben-
eficial and harmful, where they came from, and why. It included authors 
such as Vitruvius, Seneca the Younger, Pliny the Elder, and Columella.96 
All of these thinkers regard water as a sort of admixture, the flavor of 
which varies depending on what it is mixed with.97  
Lucretius expresses similar views on the composition of water and the 
flavor of liquids. According to DRN, fluidity is an essential property of 
water.98 Something liquid or fluid is smooth, round, light, and flowing – 
with an ease contingent upon how smooth, round, and light its constitu-
ents are; water is a paradigmatic example of this.99 Indeed, he calls fresh 
water ‘sweet’.100 It is nevertheless an admixture or solution in that it con-
tains a variety of constituents, not just what we might call water mole-
cules.101 In book two’s account of the relevance of stimulus shape to per-
ception, Lucretius presents honey and milk as exemplars of substances 
with a sweet, pleasant flavor; wormwood and centaury epitomize the bit-
ter, wine lees and elecampane the tingly.102 In antiquity, honey, milk, and 
wine were commonly mixed with other liquids, like water.103 It is not 
clear whether here Lucretius is referring to the herbs or to the tinctures 
or mixtures made with them. When Lucretius does specify the one or the 
other through periphrasis or context, he describes the flavor consist-
 
95 Arist. Mete. 2.3.358b2-6, 359a18-b22; Bakker 2016: 122. 
96 Rogers 2018: 4-10. 
97 They might not be surprised by the modern problem of acid rain. 
98 Lucr. DRN 1.451-54, esp. 443. 
99 Lucr. DRN 2.451-55, 3.189-202. It is also characterized as soft; 1.809. 
100 See e.g. Lucr. DRN 2.474, 5.271, 6.637, 890, 894, 1266. 
101 See e.g. Lucr. DRN 2.661-68. Milk is also sweet, pleasant, and contains nutritive con-
stituents; 2.398-403, 5.812-15. On both, see 1.885-87. 
102 Lucr. DRN 2.398-430.  
103 Cilliers & Retief 2008: esp. 10-14. See also Lucr. DRN 1.260 likening neat milk to un-
diluted wine, and the note of Rouse & Smith 1992: 22. 
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ently. Indeed, as we shall see, it is to wormwood solutions (diluta ... ab-
sinthia) – i.e. mixtures of the herb (solute) and the water in which it has 
been dissolved (solvent) – that the sea is compared in Lucretius’ refer-
ences to the salty taste of sea air.104 Seawater, according to Lucretius, is a 
mixture of smooth, round bodies with other constituents that are round 
but rough; although these do not have hooks, they are sufficiently rough 
(squalidus, asper) so as to wound the sense organs and give rise to the per-
ception of seawater’s bitter (amarus, acerbus), unpleasant flavor.105 Con-
ceivably both its smooth and rough constituents enter our passages, as, 
upon their separation, that liquid becomes sweet.106 Similarly, Lucretius 
implies that when fresh or sweet water and seawater are juxtaposed, the 
same person can perceive the flavor of each and thereby distinguish 
them.107 These things suggest that one perceives the flavor of seawater 
through interactions with the seawater itself. Moreover, since – as we 
will see – Lucretius makes explicit that wormwood solution and seawater 
have the flavor associated with their solutes (and not the flavor of their 
solvent, water), the flavor of a substance is not necessarily determined 
by the numerical predominance of the constituents entering the pas-
sages of the tongue and palate. In other words, the quantities of constit-
uents do not matter as much as their qualities and the interactions to 
which they are thus suited. Numerical predominance or concentration 
presumably impacts the strength or weakness of the flavor. Regardless, 
with respect to their relative contributions to one’s perceptions, the 
harmful interactions take precedence over the pleasurable. Thus, when 
 
104 Lucr. DRN 4.222-24, 6.928-30. Wormwood as or in liquid, see also: 1.936, 1.941 (ab-
sinthi laticem), 4.11, 4.16 (absinthi laticem). Wormwood as herb: 4.123. Centaury as 
herb: 4.125. 
105 Lucr. DRN 2.456-77; on the state of the text, see Bailey 1947: 2.878-81. 
106 Lucr. DRN 2.474-77. 
107 Lucr. DRN 6.890-94. 
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noxious solutes are mixed with water, they take precedence in the flavor 
of the solution.108  
It now is possible to turn to the passage of DRN that initiated this in-
vestigation: 4.217-29. It follows a lacuna and is repeated with minor var-
iation at 6.923-35.109 In book four it functions as part of Lucretius’ account 
of simulacra.110  At the outset, Lucretius presents a list of assemblages 
which flow from their respective sources; they are: 
 
1)  The intermediaries of sight, or simulacra, which stream off of 
all macroscopic things. 
2)  Odors, the intermediaries which come from deep within cer-
tain assemblages and effect the perception of scent. 
3 & 4) Coldness from rivers and heat (or fire) from the sun – perhaps 
evoking frost and fire, which are among the exemplary things 
within the purview of the sensory faculty of touch.111 
 
108 Phenomenological precedence coincides with but is not necessarily caused by this. 
Some solutions are made with solutes that engage as little as possible with the 
senses, so that the solutes can stand out more, as with perfumes; Lucr. DRN 2.846-
53. For a similar view of predominance and precedence, see e.g. Rudolph 2018b: 51-
53. 
109 The contents of the lacuna may be partially reflected by Lucr. DRN 6.921-22. Lines 
6.923-25 repeat 4.217-21 with minor variations that do not significantly impact 
meaning. The two most crucial lines for the purposes of this study, 4.222-23, are 
repeated verbatim at 6.928-29, as are 4.225-29 at 6.930-35 if the reconstructions are 
correct. See esp. Bailey 1947: 3.1208-10, 1694; Godwin 1986: 106; Godwin 1991: 160; 
Rouse & Smith 1992: 292-93, 563-65; Dyson 1995: 256. 
110 In the context of book six, it functions as part of the recapitulation of previously 
demonstrated points that are necessary to explain magnetism; on the structure 
and function of the account of magnetism, see e.g. Clay 1983: 189-91; Rosenmeyer 
1996. 
111 Lucr. DRN 2.431-33. Lucretius characterizes heat, for example, as an essential prop-
erty of fire (see DRN 1.451-54, esp. 453); by synecdoche, he uses it both ways. Simi-
larly, cold is used to signify both a property and some micro or macroscopic struc-
ture which has that property. See also e.g. 1.298-304, 483-503, 3.288-306, 5.592-613, 
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5)  Wall-gnawing spray, from the waves of the sea.112 
6)  Voices (4.221), the bodies deliberately emitted by living crea-
tures that can interact with the passages of the ears, effecting 
hearing. 
 
Some of these assemblages emanate from the surface of their sources (1 
and 5). Others are emitted from deep within (2 and 6). With the rest it is 
unclear (3 and 4). Only in (3) (4) and (5) are the sources of these assem-
blages specified. All except (5) are microscopic bodies. All could be con-
sidered effluences, according to the minimal notion. The ocean spray at 
any rate does not seem to be included as an intermediary of perception 
and, excepting size, it is identical in nature to its source. After the voices 
borne on the breeze, Lucretius introduces the controversial seventh and 
eight examples (DRN 4.222-24):113 
 
denique in os salsi venit umor saepe saporis,  
cum mare versamur propter, dilutaque contra 
cum tuimur misceri absinthia, tangit amaror.  
 
Finally, moisture of salty flavor often comes into the mouth when we 
are near the sea, and when we watch diluted wormwood be mixed be-




637-42. The language and mechanics of temperature and thermodynamics are 
complex and a subject worthy of further investigation. 
112 Lucr. DRN 4.220-21: ... aestus ab undis | aequoris exesor moerorum litora circum. For the 
interpretation of aestus here as ‘spray’; compare 1.719. See also aestus, OLD §6; Bai-
ley 1947: 3.1694; West 1969: 11-12; Godwin 1986: 107. Godwin also compares the 
spray with Lucr. DRN 1.311-21. 
113 For other renderings of this passage, see Bailey 1947: 1.373, 375, 563; Godwin 1986: 
25; Godwin 1991: 71. 
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The intratextual echoes between these lines and the accounts of taste in 
books two and four discussed above suggest that the sections are in dia-
logue with each other. The dialogue itself is the controversy. As we have 
seen, some scholars take 4.217-29 as a whole to refer to effluences, as mi-
croscopic replicas of their sources, and thus argue that taste, at least in 
some cases, works through effluences.114 Bailey seems to think that it 
concerns effluences, on the minimal notion, and that they lead to the 
perception of flavor in some analogous way to eating and drinking.115 In 
my view, these lines are an analogy between simulacra and other bodies 
that move through the air, such as the wall-gnawing spray of the sea. At 
any rate, the entire list proves that there are particles, both micro and 
macroscopic, which are constantly separating from their sources and 
stream off in all directions. However, only some of these are intermedi-
ary stimuli in mechanisms underlying perception. Lucretius’ focus is on 
simulacra, odors, and sounds; he suggests as much at 4.225-29.116 The om-
nipresence of those intermediaries explains why perception occurs con-
tinually and without interruption, specifically with respect to sight, 
smell, and hearing. This supports the long-established view that they op-
erate through indirect contact with the objects of their perception. Now, 
the spray, the seawater, and the wormwood solution are all liquids; I be-
lieve that this suggests the way forward with respect to the question of 
taste.117  
Lucretius’ account of the water cycle is significant for the interpreta-
tion of the taste of sea air and the taste of wormwood at a distance. Some 
 
114 See esp. Schoenheim 1966: 74, 80; Rosenmeyer 1996: 135-37; Koenen 1997: 166 n. 
15. 
115 Bailey 1947: 3.1209-10.  
116 Lucr. DRN 4.225-29, 6.930-35. 
117 Lucr. DRN 4.219-24. 
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of the account is part of Lucretius’ treatment of Epicurean meteorol-
ogy.118 As with so many topics in DRN, Lucretius actually develops one’s 
understanding of the water cycle across the poem, expecting the reader 
to connect and relate the various passages. In his greater proof that there 
are unseen bodies in nature (1.265-328), Lucretius states (DRN 1.305-10): 
 
denique fluctifrago suspensae in litore vestes 
uvescunt, eaedem dispansae in sole serescunt; 
at neque quo pacto persederit umor aquai 
visumst nec rursum quo pacto fugerit aestu. 
in parvas igitur partis dispargitur umor,  
quas oculi nulla possunt ratione videre 
 
Again, clothes hung up on the wave-breaking shore grow damp; the 
same clothes spread out in the sun become dry. But we did not see in 
what way the moisture of water soaked through, or how it fled away 
with the warmth. Liquid is therefore dispersed into small particles 
which the eyes are in no way able to see. 
 
This demonstrates that Lucretius has a concept of evaporation and con-
densation.119 The echoes of this passage in book six suggest that Lucretius 
is referring to seawater.120 Brown rightly comments on the physical em-
bodiment of the processes in 1.305-10.121 Lucretius seems to believe that 
evaporation can occur with liquids of various sorts, thus umor aquai is not 
 
118 The letter from Epicurus to Pythocles (Diog. Laert. 10.84-117) is another important 
source on Epicurean meteorology. On the water cycle in DRN and Epicurean mete-
orology, see e.g. Montserrat & Navarro 1991. On other potential valences of Lucre-
tius’ account of the water cycle, see Nethercut (forthcoming): ch. 4. 
119 See also Lucr. DRN 5.383-91. For a somewhat different interpretation of these pro-
cesses, see Montserrat & Navarro 1991: 297-301. 
120 Lucr. DRN 6.470-72, 616-18. See pp. 207-8 below. 
121 Brown 1984: 98. 
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simply a periphrasis.122 Openness to multiple explanations is a feature 
particularly of Epicurean meteorology.123 However, Lucretius repeatedly 
highlights two main causes of evaporation from bodies of liquid: the 
wind lifting or sweeping up droplets from the surface and the sun de-
taching them from it and drawing them off.124 Similarly, lightning can 
cause the flash evaporation of wine.125 Evaporated droplets do not neatly 
fit the concept of an effluence outlined above. They are more like ema-
nations than emissions, but they are taken up, not sent forth. Moreover, 
they are neither automatical or non-automatical in the way that Koenen 
describes effluences; they do not flow from their source due to atomic 
vibration or due to a non-necessitated force pressing them out.126 Rela-
tive to their sources, they flow away due to external necessitated causes. 
In DRN 1.305-10, form, content, and context imply that the last two lines 
are gnomic, that all bodies of liquid, great and small, have the potential 
to be dispersed similarly. In this exemplary case, the seawater is being 
dispersed into tiny particles (parvas ... partis) of seawater, not into parts 
which are unlike the whole. These droplets are like the aforementioned 
aestus, the spray of oceanwater – just smaller, small enough to be micro-
scopic.127 While it is not clear just how small they are, it is reasonable that 
minimal microstructures of the liquids, perhaps akin to what we call 
molecules, would be the easiest to take up or extricate. Therefore, the 
 
122 Lucr. DRN 6.470-534; see also 3.435-36. 
123 Recently, see Hankinson 2013; Verde 2013; Bakker 2016; Verde 2018. 
124 See e.g. Lucr. DRN 1.277-79, 5.264-68, 383-92, 6.616-26, and, with respect to the wa-
ter being raised or taken up 6.451-534. On the mechanism by which the sun does 
this, see West 1969: 82; Montserrat & Navarro 1991: 298. Rouse & Smith 1992: 398. 
Although the earth also sends up moisture to the clouds, this may be occurring 
with moisture that it has pressed out to the surface; see Lucr. DRN 5.483-88. 
125 Lucr. DRN 6.231-38. 
126 See p. 176 above. 
127 See also Bailey 1947: 2.649. 
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smallest possible ‘droplets’ that could still be called, e.g., seawater prob-
ably predominate. Lucretius therefore does not understand evaporation 
or condensation as a fundamental change; nothing passes outside the 
boundaries of its nature and ceases to exist as such.128 Rather, he views 
evaporation and condensation as the scattering and assembling of mi-
croscopic droplets of liquid.129 Both Lucretius and Epicurus account for 
the formation of clouds, precipitation, and other meteorological phe-
nomena in this way.130  
Other parts of the water cycle reveal more about the composition of 
seawater. In Lucretius’ narrative of the infancy of the world in book five, 
the sea was among the parts of the cosmos for which the earth provided 
the first beginnings. The others included the air, aether, stars, sun and 
moon. Their constituents were smoother, smaller, and rounder; thus the 
earth squeezed them out (expressere 5.453, expressus 5.487) through its 
sparse passages (per rara foramina terrae, 5.457) as its own constituents 
became more intertwined amongst themselves (magis inter se perplexa, 
5.452).131 The sea was salty from the beginning; Lucretius, perhaps fol-
lowing Empedocles (fr. 55), here describes it as salty sweat (salsus ... sudor) 
from the earth.132  If evaporation is not a way of distilling water and 
Earth’s water supply began as seawater, where does freshwater come 
from? Consider Lucretius’ comments on desalination in book two (2.464-
77). In his proof of the shapes of the constituents which comprise drop-
lets of seawater (sudor ... maris, 2.465), Lucretius seems to be describing a 
 
128 Lucr. DRN 1.670-71, 792-93, 2.753-54, 3.519-20. 
129 This is not far off the mark, compared with the modern understanding of evapora-
tion – relative to individual molecules of H2O and of other evaporating liquids, like 
alcohol. 
130 Lucr. DRN 5.261-80, 460-66, 6.451-534, 608-30; Epic. Ep. Pyth. 99-100, 106-9; Taub 
2009: esp. 120-21. 
131 Lucr. DRN 5.443-509, esp. 449-59, 480-88. See also 5.794. Montserrat & Navarro 1991: 
293. 
132 Lucr. DRN 5.487-88. Gale 2009: 143. 
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practice of salt production still used in the Mediterranean. Brine is chan-
neled through a sluice gate into collection pits or earthenware pans. The 
liquid gradually departs and eventually salt crystals remain.133 In Lucre-
tius’ contemporary Rome, this process was also used to collect materials 
for other products, such as perfume.134 As we have seen, Lucretius be-
lieves that all macroscopic assemblages contain void and thus are po-
rous. The wetness in caves, from water permeating through stone, is 
among his first proofs of this.135 Earthen pits and vessels should thus be 
permeable as well; indeed, they are. According to Lucretius, wine and ol-
ive oil generally percolate through some vessels, depending on the size 
of their pores. 136  In the case of desalination, seawater does too. Its 
roughly shaped elements adhere to the earth or earthenware, separating 
out. The remaining liquid seeps through into a pit where it too can po-
tentially be harvested. Repeated percolation filters out more rough ele-
ments, leaving behind the salt and literally smoothing (mansuescat) the 
rest. In other words, the acerbic seawater (Neptune corpus acerbum) no 
longer exists; bitter salt (taetri primordia viri) and sweet water (umor dul-
cis) remain.137 For Lucretius, seawater is thus a solution (or what he might 
call a mixture) of salt and water. Aristotle has a similar account of filtra-
tion using a wax vessel, but acknowledges salt-harvesting by evapora-
tion; Hippocrates favors evaporation and Pliny admits both distillation 
by filtration and evaporation and salt-harvesting by evaporation.138 For 
 
133 On ancient salt-harvesting practices and salt uses, see esp. Plin. HN 31.37-45 and 
e.g. Kurlansky 2002: 61-79, esp. 63-64. On modern salt-harvesting practices, see e.g. 
Laszlo 2001: 42-56. 
134 Longhurst 2007. 
135 Lucr. DRN 1.346-49. 
136 Lucr. DRN 2.391-97, 6.231-38. 
137 Lucr. DRN 2.464-77. 
138 Arist. Mete. 2.3.358b34-359a6, 359a22-b4; Hippoc. Aer 8. Plin. HN 31.37-45, esp. 37. 
On experiments such as filtration using a wax vessel, see Taub 2003: 102-3. 
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Lucretius, a larger scale process of desalination by filtration supplies riv-
ers and springs with fresh water; the subterranean channels of liquid are 
still briny, but by the time they emerge they yield fresh water.139 These 
in turn renew the sea.140 Indeed, this seems to be the reverse of the pro-
cess by which Lucretius explains the creation of the seas in the infancy 
of the world. Whereas then the saltwater could pass through the pores 
of the earth, now the passages of the earth are sufficiently entangled that 
the salt bodies no longer pass through easily, but rather cleave to the 
earth on account of their roughness. The same roughness of the same 
bodies wound the passages of the tongue and palate and cause the salty 
flavor of seawater. It also explains the ability of the sea spray (aestus ab 
undis, 4.219) to wear or eat away at the walls near the shore.141  The epi-
thet exesor moerorum (4.220) emphasizes that the composition of the aes-
tus and the salsi umor saporis (4.222) are the same.  
Lucretius believes that seawater is one of the primary sources of the 
umor contained in the clouds. As stated above, in book six, Lucretius re-
visits the water-logged clothes of 1.305-10. In meaning and word choice, 
he recalls salt-harvesting, the wall-gnawing aestus, and the salty taste of 
sea air. At 6.470-5 the condensation of seawater on hanging garments is 
proof of its evaporation.  The stickiness of the moisture (umoris adhaesum) 
on them emphasizes the salty constitution of the seawater. Lucretius 
takes this as an indication that moisture of the same sort (consanguineae) 
is contained in the clouds. He elaborates on these ideas in his explanation 
 
139 Lucr. DRN 5.268-72, 6.631-38; the use of virus (5.269, 6.635) perhaps recalls the fil-
tered taetri primordia viri (2.476). On subterranean rivers’ existence, see 6.540-41. 
See also Montserrat & Navarro 1991: 295.  
140 Lucr. DRN 1.230-31, 1031-32, 2.589-91, 6.890-94. 
141 See also Lucr. DRN 1.326-27 and, perhaps, 4.1286-87. On the imagery, see West 1969: 
11-12. 
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of rain at 6.495-516.142 While the former refers to clouds near the sea by 
implication, the latter does so explicitly (DRN 6.503-505): 
 
concipiunt etiam multum quoque saepe marinum 
umorem, veluti pendentia vellera lanae,  
cum supera magnum mare venti nubila portant.  
 
The clouds also often take up much marine water as well, just like 
hanging fleeces of wool, when the winds carry them above the vast 
sea. 
 
This confirms that clouds can contain evaporated seawater.143 Lucretius 
posits many sources for the clouds’ moisture over the course of DRN. The 
sea and rivers are the primary sources; others include lakes, streams, 
moisture from the earth, and bodies entering our sky and aether from 
the infinity beyond.144 To explain rain which does not taste salty, multi-
ple explanations seem available to Lucretius, including clouds from 
freshwater sources, clouds whose concentration of evaporated seawater 
was sufficiently diluted by evaporated freshwater, and a filtration pro-
cess, such that – on the way down – the aether functions analogously to 
the aforementioned earth filter. Conversely, if a sufficient portion of the 
moisture in a cloud had come from seawater, it should in due course re-
turn to the surface as brackish rain. 
 
142 With consangineae (Lucr. DRN 6.475) see also cum sanguine (6.501) in a related anal-
ogy and with vestes suspensae (6.471-72) see pendentia vellera lanae (6.504). 
143 Cf. Montserrat & Navarro 1991: 300, 308 n. 72. 
144 Lucr. DRN 5.463-66, 6.470-516. 
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THE SALTY TASTE OF SEA AIR 
 
These threads can now be pulled together and brought to bear on the 
salty taste of sea air and the bitter taste of wormwood at distance. The 
key lines bear repeating (DRN 4.222-24): 
 
denique in os salsi venit umor saepe saporis,  
cum mare versamur propter, dilutaque contra 
cum tuimur misceri absinthia, tangit amaror.  
 
Finally, moisture of salty flavor often comes into the mouth when we 
are near the sea, and when we watch diluted wormwood be mixed be-
fore us, the bitterness reaches us. 
 
Many sorts of bodies move through the air; some we can see, most we 
cannot. Moisture, for example, exists in the air near the sea. It exists in 
the form of the spray of the waves, droplets of seawater that are barely 
visible to the naked eye. It also exists as microscopic droplets of seawater 
that the sun and wind raise up from its surface. These evaporated parti-
cles of seawater reach the clouds above and the clothes and fleeces on 
the shore. It follows that these same microscopic droplets of seawater 
could also reach us when we are nearby. As we have seen, the perception 
of the flavor of a liquid occurs through direct contact between one’s pas-
sages and the constituents of the liquid which they admit, with any po-
tentially harmful constituents contributing disproportionately to one’s 
perceptions. The primary constituents of seawater are salt and water. 
One perceives a somewhat harsh or bitter flavor when the structures of 
the tongue and palate interact with seawater, due to the roughness of 
the elements of salt that it contains. In other words, a salty flavor is a sort 
of bitter flavor. The roughness of these constituents also wounds one’s 
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passages a bit, making that flavor unpleasant. Therefore, when we are 
near the sea, we perceive a salty flavor because liquid enters one’s mouth 
and that liquid is in fact seawater – evaporated seawater, microscopic 
droplets like those that gather in the clouds, clothes, and fleeces. The 
case of wormwood is similar. Lucretius says its bitterness reaches or 
touches (tangit, 4.224) us; this is evidence that evaporated microscopic 
droplets of a tincture of wormwood come into contact with the sense or-
gans of taste when the solutions are mixed before us.145 We do not regis-
ter our contact with these droplets in any way other than through their 
interactions with the passages of the tongue and palate. Unlike the aes-
tus, we do not see them. While we might feel the drops of the spray on 
the skin if we met with their splash, we do not have tactile awareness of 
an individual microscopic droplet, or even of a mist.146 It seems, then, 
that the sensory threshold of taste is lower than that of external touch. 
That said, it is unclear just how many of these microscopic droplets it 
would take for the passage-riddled tongue and palate to register the least 
perception of flavor. Perhaps it would suffice to interact with a single 
droplet of seawater or wormwood, the smallest possible. However, more 
may be required. Lucretius’ emphasis on proximity to the sources sug-
gests that perception is more likely where there is a greater concentra-
tion of the evaporated moisture.147 Alternatively, the emphasis on prox-
imity may simply reflect the longevity of those droplets and/or their po-
tential airtime if not taken up to the clouds. The larger and heavier an 
airborne particle, the shorter the distance it tends to travel before falling 
to the surface and/or decomposing.148  
 
145 Perhaps compare Lucr. DRN 4.622-26, esp. attingunt and 626-27. 
146 Lucr. DRN 3.374-95, esp. 383. 
147 Similar processes and considerations influence our susceptibility to contagion; in 
other words, we take in diseases in the form of unseen airborne bodies. Fire can 
also kindle at a distance in this way. Lucr. DRN 6.1128-30, 900-4; Epic. Ep. Pyth. 93.  
148 Lucr. DRN 4.687-705. 
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One does not deliberately take in these evaporated particles of liquid, 
nor does one feel or register awareness that they have come in until one 
perceives their flavor; this implies that one does no chewing, no pressing 
out of sucus, no processing of any kind prior to interaction. The percep-
tion of salty flavor therefore arises from interaction with the micro-
scopic droplets themselves. In other words, the seawater, as seawater, 
enters the passages of the tongue and palate. The wormwood solution 
itself does too. It follows that all of the relevant constituents are of suit-
able size and shape. Lucretius implies that, of all the things that we can 
generally see, pure water is comprised of the smoothest, roundest, light-
est constituents; to it he compares the mind and its ease of motion.149 The 
constituents of the wormwood dissolved in water, probably larger than 
those of the water, as well as rough with hooks, must nevertheless also 
be sufficiently small so as to also enter. Since one perceives the flavor of 
microscopic droplets of liquids through direct contact, it stands to rea-
son that one also perceives the flavor of a drink of liquid without chew-
ing and through direct contact. As we have seen, the mechanism for per-
ceiving the flavor of liquid should be evident from the mechanism for 
perceiving the flavor of food more generally. I propose that there is no 
need to press out the sucus in order to perceive the flavor of liquid – and 
that there is no need because it is the sucus.150 With drink then, some of 
the liquid will flow into one’s passages automatically and without emis-
sion or emanation. To call this sucus an effluence may stretch even the 
minimal notion beyond the point of utility. Perhaps more importantly, 
the interactions occur with object of perception itself, not with an inter-
mediary that only partially reflects its nature. I further propose that 
when one presses sucus out of apparently solid food by chewing, as water 
 
149 Lucr. DRN 3.177-205; see also 3.241-44, 425-29. 
150 For this reason, Lucretius can compare the sucus which Earth produced to nourish 
the first living creatures to breastmilk; Lucr. DRN 5.811-15. 
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from a sponge, the juice that one extracts is liquid food, a solution of wa-
ter and miniscule particles of the foodstuff, particles perhaps like mole-
cules. All food contains at least some amount of water.151 Moreover, the 
other constituents of the food would probably dominate in the percep-
tion of flavor. Therefore, juicing solid food allows one to perceive the fla-
vor of the food itself, also without an intermediary.152 In short, the per-
ception of flavor involves interacting directly with the object of percep-
tion in all three cases. For this reason, microscopic drops of evaporated 
wormwood solution have the same distinctive bitter flavor as both a cup 
of the medicinal tincture and the plant itself. In turn, the consistent fla-
vor of these substances serves as evidence that the same constituents are 
interacting with the passages of the sense organs. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, the salty taste of sea air and other cases which seem to 
imply the perception of flavor at a distance are only apparently a para-
dox. In fact, they are consistent with the mechanism of taste that Lucre-
tius offers and, indeed, fundamental to fully understanding it. As per the 
traditional view of Epicurean theory, the sensory faculty of taste does 
operate through direct contact with the object of its perception. Flavor 
is a property of that food or drink; it manifests at the level of experience. 
 
151 See e.g. Lucr. DRN 2.875-80, 3.223-27. By this logic it is conceivable that saliva could 
play a role in one’s ability to perceive the flavor of things that are not food, like 
rocks and other minerals that lack sucus (3.786), perhaps if sufficiently small parti-
cles thereof somehow break off into the saliva and if the passages of the tongue 
and palate are open to both. However, given the value that Lucretius places on 
empiricism, it may be worth noting in this vein that one does not normally per-
ceive the flavor of one’s own saliva. 
152 See also Bailey 1947: 3.1253. 
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For Lucretius, the phenomenal and the physiological are two closely re-
lated ways of understanding the same thing. Taste is both the perception 
of flavor and the process that underlies that sensation. Physiologically, 
taste is the mechanism by which one feels or registers awareness of juice. 
Specifically, the perception of flavor occurs when food, drink, or suitably 
shaped constituents thereof flow into the passages of the tongue and pal-
ate, i.e. the sense organs. In Lucretius’ view, both the tongue and palate 
play an important role in shaping one’s tastes and one’s preferences. 
They determine what one is literally open to tasting. The shapes of the 
constituents, on the other hand, influence the possible perceptions of 
flavor and whether that sensation coincides with pleasure or pain. If the 
food is not liquid, then the liquid food or juice that it contains, a solution 
of food particles and water, enters the passages once it is squeezed out. 
In either case one’s passages do not interact with an intermediary that 
only partially reflects the nature of the source object; they interact with 
the thing itself, whatever part of it they are open to. If one supposes that 
one is perceiving the flavor of seawater or that of wormwood at a dis-
tance, this is because one does not realize that the distance has been 
overcome – an error of reason. In fact, one is coming into direct contact 
with the object of perception. Microscopic droplets of seawater are taken 
up from the sea into the air nearby. In the same way, microscopic drop-
lets of wormwood evaporate from vats where the solution is being 
mixed. These airborne droplets – although extremely tiny – have not be-
come something else. For this reason, when they come into the mouth 
and enter the passages of the tongue and palate, the interactions are the 
same, as are the flavor and its (un)pleasantness. It may take more than 
one to stir the perception of flavor. Regardless, individually or collec-
tively, the droplets are too small for other sensory faculties to register 
awareness of them by other means, either in transit or when they make 
contact. To put it plainly: Lucretius’ example of the salty flavor of sea air 
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is no exception. Near the sea, we taste airborne evaporated seawater. 
Therefore, under certain circumstances, we taste things that we seem 
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